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This paper develops a game to study the possibility of co-operative behaviour in a situation
where the political system is dominated by two strong, opportunistic parties competing in an
economy highly dependent on the export of a commodity. Since a binding agreement as an
external solution is unlikely to succeed due to the close association between the incumbent party
and the government (the guardian), the paper explores the extent to which co-operation
between political parties that alternate in office can rely on self-enforcing strategies to provide
an internal solution. For appropriate values of the probability of re-election and the discount
factor, it is possible to rely on reciprocity to sustain an early-stopping equilibrium. However, co-
operation is undermined by low values of re-election probability out of current revenues and
party myopia. In those circumstances, the self-policing solution might not be viable and an
institutional response would be necessary. The game also sheds some light on the apparent
paradox of situations in some mineral-rich democracies (such as the recent Venezuelan
experience) where the enjoyment of considerable external revenues is followed by a period of
economic stagnation, a deterioration of political stability, and the surge of a dictatorship threat.
Keywords: Political Economy, Non-cooperative games, Democracy, Mineral Economies,
Venezuela
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1. Introduction
A standard result of non zero-sum games is that the fewer the number of players, the better the
conditions for the emergence of co-operation. When this result is translated into the political
arena, a democracy based on electoral competition between two political parties appears as the
more favourable case for the development of tacit co-operation between the players.  A second
basic result is that repetition of the game allows for reciprocity and the emergence of co-
operation. When this result is used to analyse political competition, the repeated nature of the
electoral process provides the ground for enforcement mechanisms. Hence, if parties do not
heavily discount the future the possibility of punishment coming from voters or other parties
would allow for co-operation in the politic-economic game.
The primary concern of this paper is to work out the implications of these two general results
for co-operative behaviour in a situation where the political system is dominated by two strong,
opportunistic parties competing in an economy heavily dependent on the export of a
commodity. Non-cooperative behaviour between parties brings about inefficiencies that
accumulate at an increasing rate over time and lead to political instability resulting from
economic deterioration. The analysis is particularly relevant for mineral economies, in which
foreign revenues constitute a significant part of fiscal revenues and where, due to public
ownership of the natural resources, such revenues accrues directly to the government
Since a binding agreement as an external solution is unlikely due to the close association
between the incumbent party and the government, co-operation prospects may need to rely on
self-enforcing strategies to provide a internal solution.1 The co-operative spirit of the game is
given by the preservation of democracy in the long term. The main threat to both parties is the
possible intervention of a dictator who will end the democratic game. Here the dictator option is
a source of enforcement.2 The incentives for defection are related to the incumbent's desire to
                                                                
1 The internal solution (self-policing) is basic in the sense that understanding the prospects for and
obstacles in the way of this solution helps to see what sort of external solution is necessary (Taylor, 1987).
2 By introducing the dictator as a source of enforcement the paper attaches a positive role to him in a
democratic society (of course, his value to society vanishes once he is power!).2
secure re-election and the alternative character of the game. The incumbent is tempted to spend
the stock of resources currently available to secure the re-election before the other party will.3
This game can be located in the literature dealing with sequential games where the main concern
is the strategic interaction over a state variable.4 Regarding the line of research focusing on
political economy aspects, an example of this type of game is McKibbin, Roubini and Sachs
(1987). The authors, adopting the partisan assumption and exogenous probability of re-election,
advance a method of solving linear quadratic two-party games with state variables, but they can
only obtain the solution by numerical simulation. Other examples in which the state variable is
the public debt are Alesina and Tabellini (1990) and Aghion and Bolton (1990).
The motivation of the paper is the recent experience of Venezuela. The country has been an oil
economy since the late 20s when oil displaced coffee as the main export product and source of
fiscal revenues. During the second half of the XX
th century, oil has represented, in average,
25% of GDP, 80% of export revenues and 70% of fiscal revenues. During the period 1968
until 1992, politics in the country was dominated by a two-party system that was in charge of
administering generous oil revenues. The last decade of the last century witnessed the lost of
political stability. Since 1998, Colonel Hugo Chávez has been in office with a strong popular
support, a high concentration on power and without a political opposition of significance. He is
caudillo-type figure who came to scene in 1992 as one of the leaders of a failed coup d’etat
during that year. Although the military uprising did not succeed in overthrowing the government,
it set in motion a process that undermined severely the traditional parties. 5
The paper is divided into four main sections. The first one introduces the players, strategies, and
the equilibrium concept. The following section is devoted to the analysis of co-operation
between both parties defined in terms of the possibility of reaching an early stopping equilibrium
                                                                
3 Another possible source of temptation for the incumbent is to borrow today as much as possible because,
due to the alternative character of the game, the borrower may not pay fully for the debt in the future (in
political and economic terms). For the analysis of this case see Astorga (1996).
4 The main sources of application of sequential games in economics have been resource extraction and
dynamic duopoly games. See for examples of games of resource extraction Benhabib and Radner (1992), and
Dutta and Sundaram (1988). Regarding dynamic duopoly games see Maskin and Tirole (1988a, 1988b), and
Fudenberg and Tirole (1991: 528).
5 For more information about the economic history of the country see Astorga (2000) and references therein.3
based on grim strategies. The third section explores some extensions of the model. Finally,
some concluding remarks are presented.4
2. Description of the game
In this section the players, strategies, equilibrium concept, and the pay-off function of the game
are presented, together with an interpretation of the main variables and parameters.
2.1. Players, variables, and parameters
There are two opportunistic parties and a dictator. A party is defined as  opportunistic if
enjoyment of power is its only source of utility and its overriding objective is to maximise the
expected discounted gains of being in office.6  The two parties are called Party I (she) and
Party II (he). Depending on the electoral result, each of them can play one of two roles:
incumbent or opposition. It is assumed that at the beginning of the game Party I is the
incumbent and Party II the opposition. During each electoral period the incumbent enjoys K
utils. There is no utility for the party in opposition. Previous to the election the incumbent
chooses an action x. This action can be interpreted as expenditure in public goods.
The probability of being re-elected p(x) is an increasing function of  x. It is assumed that
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< . The concavity of p(x) is due to diminishing marginal political
returns of expenditure.
Voters are assumed to assess the incumbent performance retrospectively.  During the electoral
period the utility of the voters is directly related to x. There are N voters (N very large), each of
them getting a utility of Vi(x). Their strategy is to co-operate with the incumbent (vote for it) as
far as the incumbent performs satisfactorily; otherwise to punish her by electing the opposition
party.7 Issues do not count; only results matter.
                                                                
6 Opportunistic parties do not have an incentive to appropriate part of the rents for themselves, as in the
case where parties are selfish. Hence, eventually, voters are going to receive all the rents. This is not a zero-
sum game where by repeating elections voters (acting strategically) can increase their benefits by improving
their bargaining power. For an example of selfish parties see Freejohn (1986).
7 Note that when using this strategy, although acting rationally, voters do not make any prediction about
the future (or the effects of future policies).5
Each electoral period the incumbent receives r units of resources with electoral value. The total
amount of revenues accruing to the incumbent during the period is assumed to be known.8 If
she spends this amount, she can get a probability  p r ( ) of re-election whereas if she spends x =
xe she will be certain of being re-elected, that is p(xe) = 1. It is assumed that r < xe. For the
case r >= xe, the solution is trivial: the incumbent spends x = xe in every election and remains
in power forever.
Additionally, there is a dictator who is concerned about the depletion of the country's stock of
reserves. The probability that a dictator takes over power at time t is a function of the level of
reserves Wt . In other words, the probability of his intervention increases at the pace of the
depletion of the stock of reserves. Once the dictator intervenes, he stays in power forever. This
probability can be expressed as:
p dictator t d Wt ( / ) ( ) =























The total discount factor is defined as the inverse of the probability of a dictator  (political
discount) times a constant term m accounting for the incumbent's pure myopia (which is not
related to the probability of a take-over).
d d m m t t t W p dictator = = - ( , ) [ ( )] 1  
Here, a distinction is made between two components of the discount factor. The first one finds
its justification and meaning in the political arena, reflecting the chances the incumbent party has
to be again in office. In this model, a future enjoyment of power depends on the intervention of
the dictator, but it also can be thought as accounting for the intensity of political competition,
where the entry of new competitors reduces the future chances each party has to be in office.
The second component is included to measure parties’ time preferences. It ranges from m = 0
                                                                
8 This assumption is necessary to make the interaction between the parties tractable. As a consequence, I
will abstract from the issue of volatility of external revenues, which is a key feature of many developing
economies, and particularly in mineral economies.6
(short-sighted incumbent) up to m = 1 (far-sighted incumbent). Apart for being more precise
about the definition of the discount term in the game, introducing this distinction will facilitate the
study of co-operation later in the paper.





















The total discount factor will remain fixed (d d d d t t t n t = = = + + 1.....  ) while xt+i = r, i=1... n,
that is to say, as long as expenditure equals current revenues.
The equation governing the evolution of the stock of reserves at time t is:
W W r x t t + = + - 1









ß œ ( )
 gives the number of consecutive elections that the
incumbent can win with certainty. 9
The following section offers some comments on the meaning and empirical significance of the
main variables and parameters of the model, using the Venezuelan experience as a way of
illustration.
2.2.  Interpretation of parameters values and variables
The probability of re-election is introduced to reflect the uncertainty generated by the electoral
result. A given amount of expenditure only leads to a probable electoral result. Possible
explanations for this uncertainty are lack of information about voters' preferences (or satisfaction
levels with respect to expenditure) or the effects of other variables on voter’s decisions (e.g.,
corruption scandals). Under a competitive two-party system, values of  p r ( ) around 0.5 should
be taken as more representative. This is consistent with parties with a real electoral chance.
Current revenues (r) can be measured in absolute terms or in relative terms as percentage of
average reserves or GDP. As an example, the average amount of external revenues accruing to
                                                                
9 INT[...] stands for an integer operator.7
the government in Venezuela during the 70s and 80s was of about US$12bn per year, which
represents US$60bn for an electoral period (of 5 years in this case). Seen in relative terms, for
an average value of international reserves for the same period of US$10bn, current revenues
represented six times the value of the average stock. When evaluating the electoral value of this
amount of revenues the same has to be adjusted, for instance by deducting the service of
external debt (e.g., US$3bn per year) and when used to finance expenditure aspects such as
the fixed cost of the bureaucracy should be considered.
Finally, in this game the probability of a take-over is negatively related to the stock of reserves.
The rationale for this assumption can be presented in two steps. First by pointing out the link
between reserves and recession and second by noting the causality between recession and
abstention. The line of argument is as follows: a low level of reserves would call for an
adjustment programme to be implemented in the coming administration; or, another possibility is
that the lower the amount of reserves the greater the chance of a currency crisis, which is
generally followed by a recession. Again Venezuela offers examples of both situations. In 1989
a drastic adjustment programme was introduced by the new administration after the depletion of
international reserves as the result of electoral-driven policies of the previous incumbent. As an
illustration of the latter, in 1983 a massive capital flight forced the government to devalue and
implement contractionary measures, which cost the incumbent party its re-election.
Once the country enters in a recession a period of popular discontent is expected which can be
expressed as a decline in the support for the established parties and/or in an increase in the
abstention rate. This situation can boost the dictator’s incentive to intervene, either if he is
concerned about the popular clamour or because he associates it with a low level of civil
support for the system in case of a take-over. Additionally, a situation of high abstention can
also create the conditions for the arrival of new parties with electoral chances. Both final
consequences of the drop in reserves can be modelled as an increase in the political discount
factor. To complete the definition of the game, the players’ strategies and payoff functions have
to be specified. This is next.8
2.3. Strategies and equilibrium concept
Suppose that the game begins in period 0, with the null history h





t-1} be the realised choices of actions at all electoral periods before t, and let H
t=(X)
t be
the space of all possible period-t histories. I will restrict the attention to strategies in which the
past h
t influences current decisions xi only through its effect on the state variable (Wt), which
summarises the direct effect of the past on the present environment. This class of strategies are
called Markov strategies. So a pure strategy si for player i (i=I,II) is a sequence of maps si
t -
one for each electoral period- from values of the state variable at time t (Wt) into the action set
of spending decisions X (i.e.,  s W X : ﬁ ). A  Markov perfect equilibrium is a profile of
Markov strategies  ( , ) s s I II
* *  that yields a Nash equilibrium in every proper  subgame.  This
equilibrium concept has the property of being empty-threat proof because each player’s
strategy is the best response for every possible state.
In this game  grim strategies will be used to explore the possibility of “early-stopping”
equilibrium, which will be associated with co-operative behaviour between both players. These
strategies are of the form: ‘Play xt = r in period t, and continue to play xt = r so long as the
realised action in the previous period xt-1 was r. If not, play the minimax strategy for the rest
of the game, that is to say, try to secure as many elections as possible.10
2.4.  Payoff functions
The payoff function is  m
t
t t t g W x x ( , ... )
=
¥ ￿ 0 0 , which given the assumptions stated before
becomes  m d
t
t t t t p x x W K
=
¥ ￿ 0 0 ( ... ) ( ) . The following probability tree depicts the structure of
the payoff during a sequence of electoral periods. For the sake of simplicity in the
representation, p and the discount factor are assumed to be constant, which is only true in a
particular situation when a stationary state has been reached.
                                                                
10 By playing minimax the incumbent (Player I) plays the best response assuming that the opposition party
(Player II), once in office, will play that strategy that gives the worse result for her. That is, player II will try
to minimise player I's pay-off once he has the turn to play. Under this assumption, the best that Player I can
do while she has the turn to play is to minimise the chances of Player II getting into office (consequently,
minimising the opposition party's pay-off).9
Figure 1: Probability tree of electoral gains
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The development of the payoffs during electoral periods is:
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At time t = 0 (current electoral period), Party I is the incumbent and enjoys K utils. During this
period she spends x0 and obtain a probability of being re-elected p. Thus, during the second
electoral period she will be in office (in) with probability  p, or in the opposition (out) with
probability (1 - p). The expected discounted payoff for this second period is then equal to d
[pK + (1 - p)0]. The analysis of the third period includes four possible cases, in two of them
Party I is in office with her payoff being equal to d 
2 (1 - 2p + 2p
2). For periods occurring far
into the future the probability of being in office converges to a half. Also, note that due to the
presence of discounting, expected gains get lower as times goes on.
Next the situation depicted by the probability tree will be presented in a more formal manner. In
general, at time t the total expected pay-off for the incumbent (Party I) is given by:





0 1 = + - + + + + + ( ) [ ( )] d d    
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I t+1
0  is the expected pay-off for Party I acting as opposition party at time t+1
p x
I ( ) and q x
II ( ) mean that Party I  and Party II is in office respectively.
Likewise, at time t  the opposition party (Party II) expects to obtain:
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0 stands for the expected gains for Party II being in opposition at time t.
An amount of expenditure (x) different from current revenues (r) has two contrary effects on the
incumbent's discounted expected revenues. The first effect is related to the value of the dictator
factor. When the incumbent spends more than she receives she finances the extra spending with
reserves, otherwise she accumulates reserves. A drop(increase) in reserves
increases(decreases) the probability of a dictator's take over and consequently
reduces(increases) the expected gains. The second one is linked to the probability of re-
election. An increase(decrease) of expenditure over  r improves(worsens) the incumbent's
chances of re-election, and consequently the expected gains, but worsens(improves) the
expected pay-off of the opposition party.
Player I(II)'s problem at time t is to maximise her(his) expected pay-off, taking into account the
decision of Party II(I) in that case where he(she) happens to be in office, subject to the no-







0 and the motion equation  W W r x t t t = + - +1  .
Of particular interest for the analysis is the expected pay-offs the incumbent will obtain when the
stock reaches a stationary state, i.e., values of the state variable that will be preserved once it is
achieved. This resting point corresponds naturally to the economic notion of long-run11
equilibrium. Also, as will be presented later on in the chapter, a co-operative behaviour will
require that the level of reserves will be kept constant at a certain level. 11
The stationary state
During the stationary state the incumbent sets  x r t t = " . , in which case





i iS = = = = + + 1 2 0 1 .....   for   and  ;  d d d d m t i t i s W i ts + + + = = = " 1 ( ) ,         ; where the
symbol S is used to mean stationary state. Also,  p r q r ( ) ( ) = , i.e., it is expected that for a
given expenditure both parties will obtain the same probability of re-election and will implement
the same strategy once in office. The time ts at which xt = r, depends on the path followed by
the incumbents as reflected in the history of the game h
t.
Regarding the incumbent party at time ts (which it is assumed to be Party I), the continuation
pay-off becomes:
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After substituting (6) into (5), I find the expression for the total expected pay-off for the
incumbent party in the stationary state:
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d
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On the other hand, following a similar procedure, I obtain the expected pay-off at time ts for the
party in opposition (Party II).
(8)    II p r II p r II
S
s
S S 0 1 0 1 = - + [ ( )] . ( ) . d d
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11 Regarding the analysis on uniqueness and stability of the game, it can be shown that there is
convergence towards a unique stationary state for the level of reserves (W
E ), and that the system is stable
in the sense that for an amount of reserves different than W
E , the incumbent changes the level of the
stock generating a move in the direction of the equilibrium position. See Astorga, 1996.12
(9)    II











[ ( )] .
[ ( ) ]
d
d
After substituting  (9) into (8), the expression for the total expected pay-off at time ts for the
opposition party is obtained:
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From this last expression the Pareto-optimum or efficient result for the level of reserves W
Pcan
be derived. This corresponds to the level that make the total discount factor equal to the pure
myopia value, i.e., W W
P
s / ( , ) d m m = .
After introducing the game and characterised the non-cooperative equilibrium, the next step is
to present the conditions for the emergence of co-operation between both parties.13
3. The possibility of co-operation
Sequential games differ significantly from repeated games because there is a state variable that
changes in response to players’ actions. Therefore, whether or not an early-stopping
equilibrium12 can be enforced by using grim strategies depends not only on the discount rate
but also on the level of the state variable. In this particular game, the discount factor becomes
partially an endogenous variable being determined by the level of reserves. There are mutual
gains if both parties decide to co-operate in maintaining or improving the level of reserves and,
in that way, reducing the risk of a take over. More generally it provides an illustration of the link
between the country’s wealth and the incumbent's willingness of postponing consumption when
electoral incentives are present. As an illustration of the co-operative problem consider the
following metaphor:
"Driving on a highway"
There is a car with two occupants, both wanting to be the driver. They are on a highway with
lanes of different length. The driver has an expected driving period equal to p(r), which she can
increase(reduce) by moving down(up) to the immediate lane below(above). There are two
special lanes in the highway: a lane in which there is no incentive to change (stationary lane), and
the longest lane (Pareto-Optimum).  Due to myopia, the driver might not distinguish lanes of
different length, as illustrated in Figure 4 with lanes 1 and 2 at the point marked by the dotted
line. For an amount of reserves lower than W
E , the incumbent has the incentive to increase the
stock unilaterally and, consequently, to generate a move in the direction of the equilibrium
position. By contrast, when the level of reserves is above W
E , the incumbent is tempted to
consume part of the stock in order to boost her electoral prospects. This behaviour causes a
downward movement towards the stationary lane.
                                                                
12 Here associated with an efficient equilibrium of the supergame.14
Figure 2: driving on a highway















Two incentives for co-operation can be distinguished:
i) For a given stock of reserves, both parties can co-operate on maintaining constant the
probability of a dictator (keep driving in the same lane). In that way they can avoid increasing
the risk of the system.
ii) Both parties would be better off if they could co-operate in building up reserves in order to
reduce the probability of a take over (moving to a longer lane). But the incumbent will be worse
off if, after building reserves, the opposition party wins the election and consumes part of these
newly built reserves in order to guarantee his re-election. In both cases, in order to sustain co-
operation, the parties may adopt grim strategies that contemplate as a punishment path the
reversion to W
E  (the stationary lane) as soon as possible.13
However, any level of reserves within the interval  [ , ] W W
E  (i.e., any of the lanes above the
stationary one) can be a candidate to be selected as the level to be sustained through co-
                                                                
13 It is assumed, as in the case of the supergame, that this threat is always credible (Friedman 1971). So, if a
deviant incumbent is re-elected, she will not do better than to implement the punishment first. This, however
is a strong assumption because it implies that even after a small deviation has occurred the next incumbent
will be willing to carry the punishment through, which would be a unreasonable thing to do. This problem is
due to the continuity of the pay-off function that contrast with the supergame case. Within the framework
of complete information games this assumption is questionable; a better argument for deterrence against
small changes can be found by allowing some elements of irrationality in the game.15
operative behaviour. This wide range of possibilities creates a problem of multiplicity of
equilibria.14 In contrast to a situation were both players play simultaneously, in this game the
co-ordination problem might not be so serious. The reason is that the incumbent player has a
privileged position in the sense of being able to show a commitment to co-operate, which then
can be followed by the opposition party once in office. How can a particular level of reserves
from this feasible set be chosen as the co-operative stationary state? On what grounds an
incumbent decides to choose any particular level? A plausible answer can be given in terms of
the presence of a focal point (e.g., an amount of reserves with a salient feature). Also, by
considering the internal life of the incumbent party, the selection of a particular level can be
linked to the arrival of leadership sympathetic to co-operation.
In what follows I will look for those conditions required to make co-operation of the first type,
which is the more basic of the two. The second case will not be considered here. In the latter
situation, co-operation is based on the possibility of making sacrifices in the present in order to
lengthen the life of the game and requires far sighted parties. However, when myopia dominates,
co-operation on piling up reserves is very unlikely to emerge.15
3.1.  Keeping constant the risk factor in the game
The study of the conditions for the emergence of co-operation is based on the standard
procedure that checks for the presence of incentives for defection. The focus is placed on the
Incentive Compatibility Condition (ICC), which consists of the difference between the pay-
                                                                
14 The folk theorem of repeated games assures that, for a sufficiently small discount rate, any point of the
efficient frontier can be sustained as a subgame-perfect equilibrium. The good news is that a better result
than the inefficient equilibrium can be achieved; the bad news is that any point can be sustained. The
resulting multiplicity of equilibria creates a well-recognised co-ordination problem.
15 This second case is more complicated to treat formally. The analysis could be developed based on the
idea that for co-operation of this type to emerge there are two conditions that should be satisfied. In the first
place is the feasibility condition. It demands that the future benefit of co-operation of an electoral sacrifice
has to outweigh the opportunity cost in terms of re-election chances today, assuming that there is no
incentive to deviate once a greater level of reserves has been reached. In the second place is the credibility
constraint. It demands that once the level of reserves is increased, and given that there is any further
increase in reserves, the temptation for the next incumbent to deviate (whoever party it will be) cannot be
greater than the gains for continuing co-operation. The task, then, is to evaluate if there are values for the
parameters such that the build up of reserves is both feasible to be generated by the current incumbent, and
credible to be kept by the next one.16
off the incumbent expects to receive if she deviates (I
D 1 ) and what she will receive if co-
operation is maintained (I
C 1 ).
In order to obtain the gains of defection, it is assumed that if the incumbent deviates she will try
to secure as many elections as possible. Thus the punishment phase is characterised by the
implementation of a minimax or myopic strategy (sm). During the period of deviation (not
necessarily equal to one electoral period) the incumbents will increase the pace of expenditure
reducing the stock of reserves in W
dequal to (W W
E
0 - ), assuming that deviation occurs at


















Assuming that n is an integer, (i.e., that in the period t = n+116 expenditure will be set at x=r)
the incumbent expects to obtain a pay-off after defecting equal to:17
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N 1  is the expected pay-off for the incumbent party in the stationary equilibrium and
p p x e
e = ( ) = 1 means that the incumbent's re-election is certain. The sequence of discount
factors during the deviation period reflects the fall of reserves. They are expressed as:





E ( ), ; . ( )( ), ; . ,           
                                                                
16 The subscript (n+1) indicates the electoral period at which the system would rest again in stationary
Nash equilibrium if a deviation occurred in the current period.
17 For the deviant case in which xn+1 > r, the gains of defection will be greater; therefore, by assuming n as
an integer the temptation will be underestimated. However, a probability of re-election at t=n+1 different
than p(r) will complicate the algebra and clarity of exposition without changing the conclusion of the
analysis. The pay-off under deviation for this more general is obtained by developing eq. (1) :
I K p p p p p p I p p p p I
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Where:  p p x p r W n x r d
d d e = = + - - ( ) ( ( ) ) refers to the probability that the current incumbent
will be in office at time t=n+1, given that defection has occurred at time t=0. x
dstands for the expenditure
during the period when reserves reached the equilibrium level.17
In comparison, in a situation where parties play co-operatively, the incumbent's expected pay-
off is given by:18
(12)  I =    
1C ( )
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Note that, regarding the incumbent's discounting, a difference is made between three values for
the political factor: in the first place, d d m N
E W = ( , )   stands for the discount that applies when
the system is at stationary equilibrium with reserves equal to  W
E ; in the second place, the
discount factors during the period of deviation during which reserves are falling; finally,
d d m c W = ( , ) 0  is the value for the discount factor under co-operation, assuming that reserves
are kept constant at the level shown at  t=0.19
How can co-operation be sustained?
Co-operation can emerge in this game if appropriate values for the parameters of interest (in this
case combinations of m and p(r)) can be found that makes the gains of co-operation equal or
greater than those of defection. To check under which circumstances this is the case, I will study
the incentive compatible condition
 (13)  I I
D C 1 1 0 - =
which, after substituting (11) and (12) and rearranging, results in:
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The ICC is expressed as the combination of three terms. The first one is the gains the incumbent
expects to receive for remaining in office without interruption after deviation has occurred. This
term captures the temptation for deviating from co-operation, being positively related to the
initial amount of reserves and current revenues. The second term stands for the non co-
operative pay-off for the party currently in office from period  t=n+1 onwards. The third
component gives the expression for the incumbent's expected gains under co-operation. The
                                                                
18 This expression is obtained following the same procedure employed to obtain eq.(7).
19 In the particular case where the spirit of co-operation is to minimise the risk of a take over by keeping the
level of reserves W equal to W , the discount factor only accounts for time preferences (i.e., d m c= ).18
aggregation of the last two terms gives the size of the enforcement, which size is considerably
affected by discounting, both due to political reasons or time preferences.
The balance between temptation and enforcement determines the prospects for the emergence
or break up of co-operation and this balance is the result of a combination of various effects of
contrary direction and magnitude. Some calculations based on equation (14) provide useful
information about the consequences of changes in the probability of re-election and the level of
myopia.
3.2. Two exercises of co-operation
In what follows the results of two calculations based on (14) is presented. 20 They differ in the
assumed size of the temptation, that is to say, the stock of reserves above the level of long-run
equilibrium at disposition of the current incumbent. The first calculation (shown in Figure 5)
assumed that, at  t=0, the incumbent by defecting has just enough reserves to improve
significantly her probability of re-election for a second administration. The second one (Figure
6) reflects a situation in which the electoral value of the stock, if spent, would allows the
incumbent to have a very good chance of retaining office during two consecutive periods. The
scenario depicted in Figure 5 is consistent with a reasonable initial value of reserves (e.g.
enough to cover four month of imports) and a relatively low value of the political discount under
co-operation (e.g. dc  = 0.7); whereas Figure 6 is consistent with a high stock of reserves (e.g.
eight month of imports) and a very low political discount at t=0 (e.g. dc  @ 1). Of the two
situations, the former is closer to what might happen in reality while the latter is an extreme case.
In both figures the two-dimensional projection of the ICC is plotted for combination of values of
p r ( ) and m. The white area stands for all those values of  p r ( ) and m where temptation
exceeds enforcement (values greater than zero). Shadows form the co-operative region, where
a move to a darker zone indicates that the co-operative result is less likely to be altered by
changes in the parameters of interest.
                                                                
20 The figures are generated using the simulation package Mathematica.19
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Some conclusions can be drawn from the observation of both figures. Looking at similarities,
they show that, for an appropriate discount factor, co-operation can be the result of the game.
Incumbent’s myopia undermines the incentives for co-operation. They also indicate that the
higher the value of current revenues, and consequently p(r), the better the prospects for the
emergence of co-operation. In other words, facing an unfavourable external context the
incumbent is more willing to break co-operation than in a period of buoyant external revenues.
The possibility of defeat weights more heavily than the possibility of undermining the length of
the game.
When the attention is focused on differences, the comparison between both calculations shows
that when the chances of re-election are low, a resourceful incumbent in order to co-operate
demands a lower value of m than a poorer one. That is, the resourceless incumbent is more
sensitive to myopia than the wealthy one. Conversely, a high amount of current revenues (a high
p(r)) has a greater effect in improving the conditions for co-operation in a poor incumbent than
in a wealthy one. So when the electoral value of the stock is high, co-operation prospects are
less sensitive to high levels of current revenues.20
A final observation regards the robustness of co-operation. This is represented by the intensity
of the gradation from white to black. As the co-operative zone gets darker, co-operation is
more robust to small changes in the values of the incentives (values of parameters). This tends to
be more the case for the resourceful incumbent than for the poor one. To what extent can the
observations derived from the two calculations be generalised? In the absence of an analytical
solution to the ICC, what can be said is that these patterns can be taken as representative of the
behaviour of the co-operative solution of the game. The same qualitative results are obtained in
calculations made with intermediate values for the temptation, and in that sense they are robust.
4. Extensions
In this paper the only way of financing expenditure is through own revenues. This is a quite
restrictive an unrealistic assumption. For example, external borrowing is an important source to
finance deficits.  Astorga (1996) works out the implications of the externality nature of
borrowing when decisions are made in a political framework characterised by alternation of
opportunistic parties. The main insight is that, facing an adverse or an even electoral contest, the
incumbent acting unilaterally will be always willing to contract debt to finance projects with high
political returns although these may not be justified on economic grounds. Another result
indicates that if parties are uncertain at the beginning of the game about who is going to contract
and spend the debt, they have an incentive to commit themselves to minimum borrowing. This
analysis could also be extended to a model where the state variable is the stock of capital
instead of the stock of reserves. However, this situation is of a greater level of complexity than
the one studied here due mainly to the reproductive nature of capital and the need to
differentiate between current and investment expenditure.
The model also offers some insight to the design of stabilisation funds. Stabilisation funds are an
institutional response to deal with external revenue volatility. In the absence of markets to cover
the risk involved, this solution implies a rule of saving and expenditure that provides a
mechanism of self-insurance. In this way most of the cost associated with stop-and-go economy
can be avoided if the economy is isolated from the instability and uncertainty of the main source
of income.21
One implication of the model presented in this paper is that the optimal response to windfalls
based on smoothing via a stabilisation fund would not be compatible with electoral incentives.
Given that a condition for the success of such a fund is the possibility of isolating its management
from the incumbent’s discretion, the alternation of parties in office and the potential electoral
value of the resources of the fund, generates a credibility problem. If a centralised decision is
not possible because of a problem of the type who guards the guardian, then what is left is a
self-policing solution. This would imply dealing with the two cases of co-operation presented
earlier: building up during good times, and resist temptation to deplete the stock during bad
times. Although, as was shown in this paper, tacit co-operation in maintaining a stock of
reserves is possible its emergence will be undermined when the incumbent faces drastic
fluctuation in current revenues.
5.  Final remarks
The basic question addressed in this paper is whether an internal solution exists for the
preservation of democracy and the promotion of long-term growth, or if it would require a
centralised solution to guarantee formal agreements between both parties. It has been shown
that, for appropriate values of the probability of re-election and the discount factor, it is possible
to rely on reciprocity to sustain an early-stopping equilibrium. However, co-operation is
undermined by low values of re-election probability out of current revenues and party myopia.
In those circumstances the self-policing solution might not be viable and an institutional response
would be necessary. For instance, this can take the form of delegating the incumbent's authority
to an independent agency responsible for stabilising the level of reserves, or the imposition of
constitutional restrictions on external borrowing.
Regarding the empirical relevance of this game, despite the use of restrictive assumptions it
sheds some light to understand the apparent paradox of some mineral-rich democracies (such
as the recent Venezuelan experience) where the enjoyment of considerable external resources
was followed by a long period of economic stagnation, a deterioration of the political stability,
and the surge of the threat of dictatorship.
Finally a comment on dictators. By introducing the dictator as a source of enforcement the
paper gives him a positive role in a democracy. However, the paper does not deal with the22
behaviour and results associated with an incumbent dictator.  Does the existence of
inefficiencies caused by party competition imply that an alternative regime can produce better
results? A conclusion in this direction is tempting but may be without sound basis. A real case
may be enough to make the point. Contemporary Nigeria offers a notorious example to show
what a dictatorship with oil can be. More generally, if the overriding objective of the
government is that of regime survival, the nature and amount of inefficiencies might be similar.
All regimes require legitimacy to rule, and legitimacy is based on winning political support by
granting distributive or re-distributive favours to key groups.21 The distinctive difference could
be that in the case of non-democratic regimes, elections are unlikely events and so are the
regularities associated with the electoral timing.
                                                                
21 See Ames (1987) for evidence of the inefficiencies associated with the political survival of dictatorships
in Latin America.23
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